Abstract Although Richard II's Irish expedition of 1394-95 has attracted considerable scholarly attention, the focus has largely been on Richard's relations with the colonial administration in Ireland, pointing mainly to the colonial government's plea for greater royal investment in the colony as the main factor underpinning Richard's decision to intervene in Ireland. Little attention, by comparison, has been devoted to exploring the king's relations with both the Gaelic Irish and Gaelic Scottish nobility. Using Richard's relations with the expanding Gaelic world as the main case study, this article reconsiders how developments in the Gaelic west influenced the king's decision to intervene in Ireland. Set against the backdrop of Anglo-Scottish relations and the Hundred Years' War, the article draws on a broad range of Gaelic sources from Ireland and Scotland, English and Scottish governmental records, and material from the Avignon papacy. It uncovers and traces the development of the main Gaelic Irish and Gaelic Scottish dynasties during the late fourteenth century, their relationships with one another, and their unfolding connections with the English and Scottish crowns. By locating Richard's expeditions within the broader archipelagic context, this article argues that the wider Gaelic world, though on the geographic periphery of Ireland and Scotland, was capable of exerting a far greater degree of influence on the course of "British" politics than has previously been acknowledged.
particularly the southern marches, against the encroaching MacMurrough-Kavanaghs formed but one, albeit significant, aspect of Richard's Irish venture. 2 The other main area of historical research relating to Richard II and Ireland has centered on the issue of the Gaelic submissions. It has generally been accepted that the submission of so many Irish lords (over eighty nobles submitted to Richard between January and April 1395) represented a growing willingness among the fractious Gaelic chieftains and wayward Anglo-Irish nobility to acknowledge the authority of the English crown. 3 This interpretation nevertheless, represents an oversimplification of the submissions, the political realities pertaining to late fourteenthcentury Ireland, and the extent of English power there. Rather than receiving the submissions of a host of petty, fractious chieftains, Richard was in fact negotiating with an established aristocratic alliance network that had come to dominate much of the Irish political landscape. The four most powerful of these lords-O'Neill of Tyrone, O'Brien of Thomond, Burke of Clanrickard, and O'Connor Donn of Roscommon-between them controlled over a third of Ireland (see figure 1). Furthermore, it was largely through these "Big Four" (under the guidance of James Butler (d.1405 ), earl of Ormond) that Richard secured most of the other submissions.
Though historians have outlined various reasons for Richard's Irish expedition of 1394-95, such as the Irish council's plea of 1385 and the growing threat posed by the MacMurrough-Kavanaghs in southern Leinster, the preoccupation with Anglocentric source material has detracted from explorations of Richard's relations with the Gaelic nobility. 4 Attempts at salvaging the Irish archival catastrophe of 1922 have yielded some promising results; the mainstay of recovered material nonetheless, deals with the Anglo-Irish colony. 5 The notarial instruments used to record the submissions reveal little about the aims and ambitions of the foremost Irish dynasts. Contemporary chroniclers including Henry Knighton and Adam of Usk, though rich in detail on English domestic affairs, gloss over the king's Irish expedition and divulge nothing about his relations with the most powerful Irish lords. 6 Much of John Froissart's material on the 1394-95 expedition remains apocryphal regarding Richard's dealings with the main Irish chieftains. 7 The limitations of the English material are nonetheless offset by an abundance of Gaelic sources. These records, the corpus of annals in particular, reveal not only a great deal about the aims and ambitions of the Irish lords who submitted to Richard but are essential for exploring and contextualizing Richard's relations with elements of the wider Gaelic world. 8 The submissions formed part of a much larger strategy of negotiation that extended beyond Ireland to Scotland. Richard's government had by 1390 established strong relations with the MacDonald lordship of the Isles that at the close of the fourteenth century had come to dominate much of the northern Irish Sea world and threatened to overrun large areas of the western Scottish Highlands. By negotiating with these Irish lords, as well as the highly militarized MacDonald lordship, Richard was in effect attempting to rebuild English power within the wider British Isles, albeit through non-English mediums. The only notable absentee from the submission lists, as many have remarked, was O'Donnell of Tyrconnell. 9 The fact remains that O'Donnell did not submit in 1395, nor did his allies Burke of Mayo and O'Connor Ruadh of Roscommon (see figure 1). These three lords represented an alternative aristocratic network that rivaled the "Big Four" for control of much of Ireland's western seaboard. There is, moreover, considerable evidence that O'Donnell and his allies were aligned with the Stewart monarchy and the Avignon papacy.
Richard's negotiations with the Irish lords and the MacDonald lordship of the Isles thus need to be viewed within the broader context of developments within the wider Gaelic world, the course of Anglo-Scottish relations, and the Hundred Years' War. The king's relationship with the lords of the wider Gaelic world remains a fundamentally unexplored facet of his kingship. This issue is symptomatic of both the aforementioned reliance on English source material and current historiographical and methodological trends. The work of Rees Davies and Robin Frame has been instrumental in decoding the political development of late medieval Britain and Ireland, 10 but their work, however pioneering, remains highly Anglo-centric in outlook; both scholars focus on the expansion of Anglo-French aristocratic culture, transnational landholding, and power in Ireland and the wider British Isles c.1100-c.1340. For the period c.1340-c.1460, the decline of pan-insular Anglo-French culture and power, coupled with the deterioration of Anglo-Scottish relations, has led historians to move away from the "British Isles" model espoused by Davies and Frame toward the "Plantagenet" model of interpretation, locating the development of English power in Ireland, for example, within the context of the wider Plantagenet empire. 11 Though offering useful insights into the inner workings of the AngloIrish colony, this approach has drawn attention further away from the Gaelic west. Historians of late medieval Scotland in comparison have, understandably, adopted a more national-centered approach when examining the consolidation of Bruce and early Stewart Scotland, albeit with limited consideration for Scotland's relations with Ireland. 12 This present article argues for the continued worth of using the archipelagic model in exploring the political development of Britain and Ireland in the later fourteenth century-particularly when considering the role of the wider Gaelic world in influencing the course of "British" politics. Brendan Smith and Michael Brown have both outlined the value of utilizing such an approach when exploring inter-insular relationships between c.1300 and c.1460, though admittedly from respective Anglo-and Scottish-centric perspectives. 13 Steven Ellis has drawn attention to the Gaelic world (or "Celtic fringe") as a force within late medieval "British" politics, yet his approach is likewise highly Anglo-centric in outlook. 14 Believing the Gaelic resurgence of the fourteenth century to have been built upon "flimsy military foundations," Ellis has focused on the expansion of English power within the wider British Isles rather than assessing how developments within the wider Gaelic world could act as check on English expansion. 15 Ellis's views on Gaelic identity have in turn drawn criticism from scholars such as Wilson McLeod and Martin MacGregor, who have both offered more nuanced readings on Gaelic cultural and political identity during the late medieval period. 16 Yet McLeod's and MacGregor's models, though offering useful insights into concepts of Gaelic identity, ultimately lack a forensic examination of the hard political and dynastic structures underpinning Gaelic Irish and Gaelic Scottish interaction during the later medieval period.
By using Richard II's relations with the wider Gaelic world as a dedicated case study and by drawing upon a broad meld of material from within the Gaelic world, English and Scottish governmental records, and material from the Avignon papacy, this essay challenges the notion that events in the Gaelic west were peripheral to the political development of late medieval Ireland and Britain. The first section explores Richard's relationship with the MacDonald lordship of the Isles and its significance for Irish affairs. The next section examines the context surrounding the emergence of the "Big Four" and their enemies in Ireland during the later fourteenth century and the way that this, in tandem with events in Gaelic Scotland, laid the foundation for Richard's expedition in 1394-95. The third and final section focuses on Richard's Irish venture of 1394-95, reassessing the submissions and his difficulties in achieving a permanent settlement in Ireland. The complexity of lineage-based societies and the fragmentary nature of surviving source material can make sifting through the dynastic world of Gaeldom appear to be an arduous task. The associated maps and tables, however, provide guides essential for locating each lordship geographically, tracing the development of each, and navigating the complex, dynastic milieu of the late fourteenth-century Gaelic world.
GAELIC SCOTLAND IN THE LATE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
It is rarely acknowledged that over the course of the later Middle Ages, nearly half the landmass of Britain and Ireland fell under autonomous Gaelic control. In Ireland, a combination of factors including the Bruce invasions (1315-18), the Black Death, a cooling of the climate, and the migration of Scottish mercenary galloglass to Ireland saw English power across the northwestern section of the island retreat significantly. Though Robin Frame has amply demonstrated that English power in Leinster and much of Munster was exercised effectively by the colonial earls, a good deal of the northern and western seaboard, including most of the de Burgh earldom of Ulster and lordship of Connacht, was lost to resurgent Irish dynasties or to the increasingly independent and acculturated Anglo-Irish Burkes of Clanrickard and Mayo. 17 A similar process occurred in fourteenth-century Scotland, providing context crucial for exploring Richard II's later Irish venture. Robert Bruce's wars for control of Scotland in the early part of the century, coupled with the extinction of certain noble lines, brought about the disintegration of royal power in northern Scotland. 18 As in Ireland, the political vacuum was filled by resurgent Gaelic clans such as the MacRuairís of Garmoran, the Clan Donnchaidh of Atholl, and the Clan Chattan of Lochaber and Badenoch, many of them migrating eastwards from the western highlands 19 The most powerful Gaelic faction to emerge during the first half of the fourteenth century was the MacDonald lordship of the Isles. 20 The lordship was comprised of numerous Hebridean and west highland kindreds, each subject to the nominal authority of the lord of the Isles, a direct descendant of Somerled (d.1164), king of the Hebrides (see figure 2) . Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the lordship of the Isles became a major political force within the Gaelic world and also on the wider "British" stage. This powerful position rested chiefly on the lords of Isles' ability to raise considerable military and maritime resources from the various sub-kindreds. 21 Though the lordship crumbled apart in the late fifteenth century, largely due to internecine struggles and growing royal Scottish encroachment, successive lords of the Isles were able to maintain the relative cohesion of the wider lordship until the mid-fifteenth century.
It was under the leadership of John MacDonald of Islay (d.1387), the first lord of the Isles, that the lordship emerged as a potent force within the Irish Sea world. The lordship's strategic position made it an ideal ally of the English crown, and from the late 1330s to the late 1360s John was courted by Edward III of England and by Edward Baliol, the pro-English claimant to Scotland. 22 These accords proved mutually beneficial. On one level, they helped safeguard England's northern frontiers with Scotland during the early decades of the Hundred Years' War. 23 They also served to protect the east coast of Ulster from Scottish intervention. For John, the accords gave him a freer hand to continue expanding across large areas of northern Scotland, as well as the opportunity to meddle in affairs in Ireland, where he had considerable interests.
Sometime during the early 1330s, John allegedly exiled his cousins, the Clan Alexander, to Ireland. 24 There they were subsequently forced to become mercenary galloglass, serving the expansionist O'Neills of Tyrone, then led by Aodh Reamhar O'Neill (d.1364). Though the record is fragmentary, it appears that John became concerned that the Clan Alexander, with O'Neill support, would attempt to retake IslayJohn's seat of power. 25 He quickly set about shoring up alliances in both Scotland and Ireland. In 1337 he married Amy MacRuairí, sister of Ruairí MacRuairí of Garmoran, the most powerful lord in the northern Hebrides-a match that secured him possession of the northern Hebrides following Ruairí's assassination in 1346 (see figure 2) . 26 In Ireland John moved to cultivate links with the O'Neills' Irish enemies and the English administration. In 1335 he had traveled to Drogheda to assist in preparations for an attack on Scotland. Three years later he successfully petitioned Edward III (d.1377) to allow his cousins, Hugh and John Bisset, to acquire possession of the Antrim-based barony of Larne and Isle of Rathlin respectively (see figure 2) . 27 John also secured from Edward III a number of safe passes to allow himself and his mother, Áine, the daughter of O'Cahan, to travel between Scotland and Ireland in 1337 and 1338. 28 Áine was a member of the O'Cahan kindred whose lordship was located on the northern coast of Ulster, bordering the O'Neill lordship of Tyrone (see figure 2) . She had married, c.1300, John's father, Angus Óg-a previous lord of Islay who fell at the Battle of Faughart during the Bruce Invasions of Ireland in 1318. 29 Soon after the granting of the 1338 pass, Áine married Murtagh Ceannfhada O'Neill (d.1395), the brother of the lord of the Clandeboy O'Neills, Brian (d.1369). The Clandeboy O'Neills were regional rivals of the Tyrone branch and contested the Tyrone's branch's claim to the chieftaincy of the wider O'Neill kindred (see figure 2) . 30 As allies of the colonial government, Brian and his brother Murtagh Ceannfhada acted as a check on the territorial ambitions of Aodh Reamhar O'Neill, lord of Tyrone and patron of the Clan Alexander. By drawing the O'Neills of Clandeboy and O'Cahans closer to one another, John created a buffer between himself and the Clan Alexander, while at the same time helping to protect the earldom of Ulster, now confined to an increasingly narrow strip of land hugging the southeast coast of Ulster. Moreover, John is recorded as leading two expeditions to Ireland (probably in the mid-1340s) in an attempt to secure the O'Neill chieftaincy for his cousin, Brian; both ventures failed. 31 Despite the highly fragmentary nature of surviving source material, it appears that relations between the lordship of the Isles and the O'Neills improved during the last two decades of the fourteenth century. The reconciliation of the O'Neills of Tyrone and Clandeboy during the late 1360s undoubtedly contributed to this process. 32 Developments in the western section of Ireland-namely, the rise of the O'Donnells-played an equal if not more important role in strengthening ties between the O'Neills of Tyrone and the Islesmen (and are discussed in greater detail below). It is also worth noting here that by the late 1370s the Clan Alexander had fragmented into a series of sub-kindreds. Though the main sept remained in the employ of the O'Neills of Tyrone, the smaller family branches migrated westward into Connacht. Here they sought and eventually found employment with kindreds allied to the O'Donnells. 33 There is evidence (outlined below) to suggest that the O'Donnells had by the early 1380s drifted into the orbit of the Scottish crown. Hundred Years' War, the government of Richard II sought to exploit this shift in Gaelic realpolitik through negotiation with the O'Neills and their allies (a topic discussed below, in the final section) and by allowing a more permanent MacDonald presence in Ulster.
The death of David II in 1371 and the accession of Robert Stewart (d.1390) as Robert II led to a brief period of rapprochement between the lord of the Isles and the Scottish crown. Unlike David, Robert enjoyed more cordial relations with his Gaelic-speaking subjects. Originally hailing from western Scotland, he was acculturated to Gaelic Scotland and able to move easily between the Gaelic and ScotsEnglish-speaking worlds. 34 In fact, much of his support base within the kingdom derived from Gaelic kindreds, such as the Campbells of Loch Awe, the Clan Donnchaidh of Atholl, and the lordship of the Isles. 35 Married to Robert's daughter Margaret in 1350, John had aligned himself with the Stewarts during David II's protracted captivity (1346-57) before drifting back into English allegiance upon David's return to Scotland in 1357. 36 As a son-in-law of the new king in 1371, John perhaps hoped to secure legitimization for his "acquisitions" in northern Scotland. 37 A combination of factors, however, placed great pressure on his relationship with the new regime. As suggested by Alexander Grant, John may have expected to have been awarded a grant of royal lieutenancy over much of western Scotland; instead the lieutenancy was awarded to Gillespic Campbell of Loch Awe, one of John's main regional rivals. 38 The far more damaging rift, however, occurred in northern Scotland, where Robert II failed to curtail the activities of his son, Alexander Stewart, the infamous "Wolf of Badenoch," whose forces continually raided John's holdings in Lochaber (see figure 2). 39 Within a few years, tensions between John and the crown had risen once again. With little recourse, John had by the late 1370s revived his alliance with the English government. 40 Once more this arrangement proved mutually beneficial. The renewal of the Hundred Years' War in 1371, the advent of Franco-Castilian naval supremacy, and Robert II's commitment to the French meant that English holdings within the Irish Sea world were vulnerable to French and Scottish attack. 41 43 English possessions in Ireland were also subject to French and Scottish attack. In 1381 the port town of Kinsale on the southwest coast of Ireland was raided by a large Franco-Castilian force commanded by Jean de Vienne (d.1396), the admiral of France and architect of French naval supremacy. 44 Richard subsequently approved funds for the walling of Kinsale to protect the inhabitants from further attack. 45 The port of Waterford was likewise raided by Castilian forces in 1377, while the city of Cork and its hinterland in 1388 are recorded as suffering numerous burnings at the hands of Irish rebels and the king's enemies. 46 More striking still is that in 1388 (a year after John's death) a large Scottish force commanded by Sir William Douglas of Nithsdale (d.1391) ravaged colonial settlements at Carlingford Lough before raiding the Isle of Man as part of the broader Otterburn campaign. 47 These attacks capitalized upon the English entanglement on the European continent, particularly during the mid-1380s, when English forces had become increasingly ensnared in the Iberian Peninsula. 48 Though the earldom of Ulster had by this time shrunk to a thin strip of coastline, it appears to have remained economically viable due to a lucrative fishing trade operating from Strangford Lough, Carlingford, and the Abbey of Inch (see figure 2). 49 Moreover, the defense of Carrickfergus Castle remained of paramount importance both to the Crown and Irish Council; in 1392 it was feared that Carrickfergus would fall to the Gaelic Irish, and the justicar, Sir John Stanley (d.1414), received orders to reinforce the castle's defenses. 50 John's considerable military and maritime resources offered a greater degree of protection to English holdings north of Wales, especially the castles and fisheries of eastern Ulster. Prior to his removal from governance in 1387, Richard II took steps to secure a greater MacDonald presence in Ulster. On 16 February 1387 a license was granted by the Irish Council for the marriage of Robert Savage to Christina, a daughter of John, lord of the Isles. The marriage was subsequently ratified by the English Council on 4 May 1388. 51 The identity of Robert Savage is uncertain, but, as Katharine Simms has suggested, he was most likely the son of the previous crown seneschal of Ulster, Robert (d.1360) and brother of the current seneschal, Edmund (fl.1385). 52 Based in the Ards Peninsula and originally of Anglo-Norman extraction, the Savages had defended the declining earldom of Ulster from O'Neill expansion for much of the earlier fourteenth century. Despite a brief spell of disfavor in the 1370s, the Savages had reestablished themselves during the early 1380s as key agents of both the English crown and the Mortimer earls of March. 53 There is evidence to suggest that the Savages were highly acculturated to the sociocultural world of Gaelic Ireland, and by association, of Gaelic Scotland. For example, a Jenkin Savage, possibly a brother of Robert (d.1360), was a noted patron of Gaelic bards-this would help explain and contextualize their cordial relations with the lord of the Isles. 54 The Savage match of 1387 formed the basis for further MacDonald expansion in Ireland, which again served the purposes of the both MacDonalds and the English crown. By 1387, John of Islay was an old man; he was probably in his late eighties and had ruled the Isles successfully for more than fifty years. He may, however, have been concerned regarding the succession of the lordship. 55 It has been suggested that following his death later that year, there may have been a very brief period of interregnum in the lordship of the Isles, and that there was some opposition among the island kindreds to the succession of his heir designate, Donald (d.1423), the grandson of Robert II. 56 The council of the Isles (comprising the chiefs of the main island kindreds) soon agreed to support the decision of Ranald-John's eldest son by his first marriage to Amy MacRuairí-who had been acting as the caretaker lord of the Isles until Donald was ready to take power. 57 In any case, there was a brief period during which the lordship of the Isles may have been vulnerable to a dynastic challenge from the Scottish monarchy or their recent Irish allies, the O'Donnells. 58 The marriage of Christina (Donald's sister) and Robert Savage gave the new lord of the Isles a greater foothold in Ireland and formed the basis for the subsequent MacDonald acquisition of the Seven Glynns of Antrim. The precise dating of the MacDonald acquisition of the Glynns-brought about by the marriage of Donald's brother, John Mór (d.1427) (son of John of Islay and Margaret Stewart) to Marjory Bisset, the heiress to the Glynns-remains uncertain. John had certainly secured possession of the Glynns in 1400, owing to the fact that he is styled as lord thereof in correspondence with the English crown. 59 Though historians have gravitated toward this later date, by broadening the scope of investigation it becomes possible to posit an earlier date for the acquisition. Allowing for a greater degree of MacDonald influence in Ulster was part of a broader "British"-oriented defensive system orchestrated by Richard II, though a rarely acknowledged aspect of his kingship. 60 Through the promotion of loyalist servitors and by forming alliances with non-English mediums, such as the lordship of the Isles, Richard hoped both to secure his own personal rule and rebuild English power within the wider British Isles. For example, as Prince of Wales, he enjoyed a strong support base among the native Welsh and colonial communities. He also promoted strong relations with the port town of Chester and in 1392 granted possession of the strategic Isle of Man to the loyalist William Scrope (d.1399). 61 Ireland, nonetheless, continued to pose a significant challenge due to the lack of effective English royal power beyond the colony and the increasing level of aristocratic factionalism among the Anglo-Irish community. 62 Negotiating with the wider Gaelic nobility, the MacDonalds in this instance, and their capacity to raise considerable military resources in regions beyond effective English influence, offered Richard a solution.
In October 1389, a year after Richard reassumed power, Edmund Savage was granted the wardship of the heiress Marjory Bisset and her sister Elizabeth-both daughters of the recently deceased "Hugh Byset"-with permission to marry them to any of the king's loyal lieges. 63 While no record provides a date for the union of John Mór and Marjory, it is possible that the match may have occurred as early as 1390. Surviving proclamations of Anglo-French treaties between August 1389 and March 1396 name John Mór ("Jehan de Ysles" or "Johan des Isles") as an ally of the English crown. 64 The fact that the actual lord of the Isles, Donald, is not included suggests that John Mór had become the main intermediary between the crown and his brother and may have been engaged in negotiations with the crown and Savages as early as 1389, settling soon after as the de facto lord of the Glynns. 65 The Nicholls and later adopted by Art Cosgrove. 72 Both scholars have alluded to the existence of these networks in Connacht. However, the fact that these Connacht-based alliances developed into larger, competing aristocratic networks that eventually came to dominate nearly two-thirds of Ireland during the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, remains hitherto unacknowledged in the historiography.
It is important to bear in mind that while this conflict stemmed from a civil war in Roscommon, hegemonic control of Connacht was, in reality, contested by the more powerful patrons of O'Connor Donn and O'Connor Ruadh, namely the competing Burke of Clanrickard and Mayo families (and eventually by the O'Briens, O'Donnells, and O'Neills). Initially this conflict had been confined west of the River Shannon, primarily to the province of Connacht. In the space of a few short years, however, it had spread to neighboring provinces of Ulster, Leinster, and Munster (see table 2 and figure 1). The reasons behind the expansion of this conflict lie in the geopolitical situation pertaining both to Connacht and the other provinces and to the political and territorial ambitions of the main magnates therein. The lords of western Leinster became drawn into the conflict in eastern Connacht partly due to power struggles in northern Leinster but also to maintain control of the Shannon. The Ulster dimension to this conflict was perhaps the most significant and is essential in exploring why the O'Neills later wished to cooperate with Richard. . This powerful position rested both on the compliance of these lesser kindreds and on the relative cohesion of the wider Tyrone lordship. As with the Donn and Ruadh factions in Connacht, the allegiance of the smaller lordships, Maguires and MacMahons, was maintained through ties of dynastic politics including marriage alliances and fosterage but also enforced through military intimidation. Niall Mór and Ulster-a prime example being the O'Neill assault upon the town of Dundalk on the north coast of Leinster in 1392 (see figure 2) . 81 The O'Donnells, however, had one major advantage in this broadening geopolitical conflict. Unlike Tyrone, Tyrconnell was a maritime lordship, and there is evidence to suggest that the O'Donnells were able to draw upon sizeable maritime resources, giving them a tactical advantage over their opponents. The importance of galleys and other seafaring craft in Gaelic Scottish warfare has been amply demonstrated. Galleys or smaller craft like birlinn enabled west Highland factions such as the MacDonald lordship of the Isles and Campbells of Loch Awe to dominate much of the western Scottish seaboard, patrolling strategic lochs and safeguarding trade routes and maritime passageways. 82 Yet historians of Gaelic Ireland have tended to overlook the importance of the maritime landscape in late medieval Irish politics, a topic that to date has largely been the pursuit of marine archaeologists. 83 The O'Donnells were noted for their ability to raise from among their sub-kindreds large military forces, including cavalry drawn from the O'Dohertys of Inishowen and light infantry or "kern" from the O'Gallaghers and O'Boyles of Boylagh. 84 The three MacSweeny galloglass septs of Fanad, Banagh and na Doe, however, formed the backbone of O'Donnell armies. Originally hailing from Knapdale in western Scotland, the MacSweenys were displaced during the Scottish-Norse wars of the late thirteenth century and the Anglo-Scottish wars of the early fourteenth century. 85 As demonstrated elsewhere, the ability to intervene in far-flung regions of Gaelic Ireland would later prove essential to establishing the O'Donnell hegemony over much of northwestern Ireland in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 87 During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, maritime connections enabled the O'Donnells and MacSweenys to develop and strengthen the alliance with the Ruadh faction in Connacht. Though composed in the early sixteenth century, the genealogical history of the MacSweeny dynasty, the Leabhar Chlainne Suibhne, recounts that by the early fifteenth century the MacSweenys had married into the O'Malleys of the Owles-another prominent seafaring kindred (see table 1 and figure 1) . 88 2) . 90 The sea was important to the O'Donnells and their allies for two further reasons. The cooling of the climate in the fourteenth century resulted in the migration of vast herring stocks to the coasts of Ireland and Scotland. 91 The influx of English, French, Spanish, and Dutch fishermen generated considerable prosperity for the Gaelic nobility. Using fleets, Gaelic kindreds such as the O'Donnells, (or the O'Malleys, the O'Driscolls, and the O'Sullivan Beare dynasties of south Munster), and the Campbells of Argyll imposed levies on visiting fishermen for fishing within their respective spheres of influence or for seeking shelter along the coast. 92 The wealth generated by the fisheries enabled the Gaelic nobility to develop trading links with the rest of the British Isles and continental Europe. Over time the lords of the western Ireland built strong trading connections with insular ports such as Bristol and Glasgow as well as continental trading hubs including La Rochelle and Bordeaux (O'Donnell's soubriquet "an Fhíona"-"of the wine"-suggests he may have been personally involved in the trade). 93 The O'Donnells also maintained a network of agents in many of these ports to safeguard their mercantile interests and also to carry and receive news, 94 ensuring that the Gaelic "periphery" remained attuned to developments within the wider Atlantic world. 95 The Irish intrigues of the later Stewart kings, James IV (d.1513) and James V (d.1542), particularly their relationship with the O'Donnells, has been the subject of recent scholarship. 96 The O'Donnell-Stewart alliance of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century was nonetheless, built upon much earlier foundations that can be tentatively traced to the early 1380s. Indeed, though it has received little scholarly attention, the O'Donnell's alliance with the Stewart monarchy runs like a leitmotiv through the history of late medieval Ireland. Evidence for the origins of this relationship is contained in the registers of the Avignon papacy. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the development of the church in late medieval Gaelic Scotland, including the impact of the Avignon papacy. 97 Aside from a number of short studies, little research has been conducted on the Papal Schism's impact upon Gaelic Ireland. 98 Though Edouard Perroy originally framed Richard's Irish expeditions as a crusade against the Clementist Irish, it has generally been assumed that the Avignon papacy had little impact upon Gaelic Irish politics. A reexamination of surviving sources suggests otherwise. 99 The papal schism of the later fourteenth century further entrenched preexisting alliance blocs that had developed across Europe during the Hundred Years' War. Among those adhering to the Roman papacy of Urban VI (d.1389) were the English, the Flemish, the Danes, the Swedes, the northern Italian city states, the Poles, and the Hungarians. Conversely, Clement VII of Avignon (d.1394) was supported by the French, Castilians, and Aragonese, the kingdoms of Naples and Cyprus, and Scotland. In Ireland, there appears to have been a large support base for Clement VII in the dioceses of Raphoe, Killala, Clonfert, Clogher, and Annaghdown, with a lesser following in the dioceses of Tuam and Elphin. 100 Raphoe, Killala, Clonfert, Annaghdown, and western Clogher were each controlled by lords of the Ruadh faction. Tuam and Elphin, on the other hand, were divided between the Donn and Ruadh factions, which may explain the resistance to Avignon influence there. 101 A full reconsideration of the Avignon papacy's impact upon the wider HibernoScottish world remains a desideratum. Such an enterprise is made extremely difficult due to the limitations of surviving source material. While this article is not the forum for such an undertaking, there are nonetheless, a number of brief points to make in relations to the Scottish-Avignon interest in late fourteenth-century Ireland and how this ultimately shaped Richard II's security concerns regarding the island. The possible adherence of the aforementioned dioceses and lordships to the Avignon papacy opened up a further international dimension to Irish politics. Material contained within the calendar of Avignon papal registers indicates that members of the Ruadh faction were in contact with the Scottish king through clerical intermediaries loyal to the Avignon papacy from 1379 onwards. While the greater number of petitions were sent directly to Avignon, it appears that some were forwarded to the Scottish court and were included in Robert II's correspondence with Clement VII in 1381. 102 These petitions originally came from the O'Muldoons of Lurg and the O'Lennons of Lisgool, both located in the diocese of Clogher. 103 While the political allegiance of the O'Lennons is more difficult to trace due to the fragmentary nature of source material, it is worth noting that the bishop of Clogher, John O'Corcrain, wrote to Richard II c.1380 informing the king that he had been driven from his bishopric; whether or not this was linked with Scottish/Avignon involvement in Clogher remains uncertain. 104 The O'Muldoons, on the other hand, appear to have been allies of the O'Donnells and controlled a territory coexistent with the modern-day barony of Lurg. Their lands were, moreover, located north of the passes from Connacht into Ulster and were subjected to raids by members of the Donn faction (see figure 1) . 105 A pattern of communication between the O'Donnells and their allies and the Scottish monarchy appears to have developed over the next number of years. This is evident both from further material contained in Avignon registers and the broader context of Scottish activity in the wider Irish Sea world. In February 1383, the bishop of Glasgow, Walter Wardlaw (d.1387), was ordered by Clement VII to assist in removing the bishop of Killala, Robert Eliot, to put in place the Clementine favored candidate, Cornelius O'Connor. 106 The following year Wardlaw was appointed Avignon papal legate for Ireland and Scotland with the intention of further undermining English and Roman papal influence in the northern Irish Sea world. 107 Though Wardlaw died in 1387, there is evidence that his successor as bishop of Glasgow, Matthew Glendinning, maintained the connection with Ireland and in 1394 he secured a benefice in the diocese of Sodor for one "Maurice Nemie" of Raphoe diocese in Tyrconnell. 108 The movement of Avignon clerics across the North Channel provided the Stewart monarchy with a direct line of contact to the O'Donnells of Tyrconnell. 109 As noted, the early Stewart kings Robert II and Robert III (d.1406), in the mold of their ancestor Robert Bruce, were acculturated to the Gaelic world and enjoyed strong relations with many Gaelic Scottish factions such as the Campbells of Loch Awe and Clan Donnchaidh of Atholl. Cultivating cordial relations with these lords was essential to the security of the Scottish kingdom, particularly from the 1380s onwards once the MacDonalds switched their allegiance to Richard II. These cultural and political ties to Gaelic Scotland acted as a bridge into Gaelic Ireland and allowed the Stewarts to develop an alliance with the O'Donnells. Indeed, though it is beyond the scope of this present article, there is evidence to suggest that the Campbells of Loch Awe may have developed links with the O'Donnells during this time. 110 From the Scottish perspective, the alliance with the O'Donnells opened another front against the English in the western section of Ireland. This new theatre of military operations, in addition to aforementioned Scottish forays on eastern coast of Ulster and the Franco-Castilian raids on the south coast of Ireland, placed greater pressure on English military and financial resources. The O'Donnells could also contribute to the defense of Scotland, largely by tying English forces down in Ireland and, perhaps more importantly, by acting as a check on the MacDonalds. As noted earlier, it appears that by the early 1380s the Clan Alexander-the dynastic rivals of the lords of the Isles-had fragmented into smaller family branches. One of these branches migrated westwards, and by the early 1390s had found employment as galloglass under the Taken at face value, surviving Anglo-Irish and English sources suggest that the colonial nobility's knowledge of developments in the western section of Ireland was limited. Developments in western Ireland were, however, unlikely to appear in English patent or close rolls unless of direct concern to the colonial government. 116 Yet Richard's actions in Ireland point to his having, at the very least, some understanding of the significant geopolitical shift then occurring in the western section of Ireland and the growing level of Avignon and Scottish influence there. Indeed, much of Richard's intelligence on affairs in western Ireland may have derived from the colonial earls who, as Robin Frame has outlined, had successfully adapted to frontier life in fourteenth-century Ireland. 117 James Butler, third earl of Ormond, for example, not only acted as interpreter for Richard during the submission of numerous chieftains but, according to Froissart, played an important role in persuading the most powerful chieftains to submit. 118 An investigation of the Richard's initial military campaign, coupled with an analysis of the submissions themselves, and the context of specific grants made to individual Gaelic lords, in turn, suggest that Richard was more informed on Gaelic affairs than is evident in surviving chronicle sources.
As noted in the introduction, the threat posed to colony's southern defenses by Art MacMurough-Kavanagh (d.1416/17) has attracted considerable scholarly attention. The course of Richard's successful campaign, culminating in Art's submission on 7 January, has been dealt with elsewhere. 119 Richard's success against the MacMurrough-Kavanaghs coupled with the sheer military might of his forces has long been regarded as one of the chief reasons why the other Gaelic lords felt compelled to submit (see table 3 ). 120 If this threat of force was indeed a factor, then it pertained mainly to the submissions of the Gaelic and rebel Anglo-Irish lords in Leinster, where the proximity of the royal army was more visible. For example, Murchadh O'Connor of Offaly (d.1421)-a member of the Ruadh faction-is recorded as being on the (see  table 3 ). 122 In comparison, the terrain of the Gaelic heartlands stretching from Thomond on the Atlantic seaboard to the northern coasts of Ulster presented a foreboding obstacle to Richard's army. The king would have been faced with a powerful coalition of Irish chieftains in the Donn faction had he decided to march north in an attempt to force their submission. That scenario was unlikely, considering that Richard's army was needed to secure Leinster and prevent Art MacMurrough-Kavanagh from breaking his peace. The activities of Richard and the lords of the Donn faction suggest instead that both parties hoped to achieve a mutually beneficial arrangement.
Accompanying Richard on this expedition were a number of prominent English noblemen, chief among them Roger Mortimer (d.1398), fourth earl of March and the greatest absentee landlord in Ireland. In addition to his expansive estates in England and southeast Wales, Roger had inherited the earldom of Ulster and lordships of Connacht, Trim, and Meath from his father, Edmund, third earl of March (d.1381). 123 The recovery of these estates was of paramount importance to Richard and fitted into the aforementioned strategy of strengthening English power in the "peripheral" areas of the British Isles. 124 Richard had already developed a link between the MacDonalds and Mortimer through the earl's tenants, the Savages, and their marriage into the Bisset affinity. The remainder of Mortimer's Irish lands were largely controlled by members of the Donn faction (although figure 1) . 127 For Richard, it was clear that military action against the lords of the Donn faction would yield minimal results. By negotiating with these lords, he stood a better chance of recovering of recovering the Mortimer inheritance; moreover, the establishment of strong, cordial relations with these lords would greatly bolster English influence across the northwestern section of the island and limit the potential for Scottish intervention in Ireland.
Richard thus strove to build stronger links between the lords of the Donn factions, the colonial administration, and the crown. He secured a greater degree of legal protection for the submitted lords by defining their legal status before the Irish Council, issuing pardons for past offences, and knighting the more powerful lords-Niall Óg, Brian O'Brien (d.1400), Turlough Óg O'Connor Donn, and William Burke of Clanrickard (d.1423) (as well as Burke's regional ally, Walter Bermingham). 128 The knighthoods bound these lords closer to the king; the case of O'Connor Donn is particularly important. In addition to being admitted to English law (placing him, in the words of one scholar, within Richard's "charmed circle"), O'Connor Donn was also granted the constabulary of Roscommon Castle. 129 Once a bastion of English power west of the Shannon, Roscommon Castle had been lost to the O'Connors since the 1350s; Richard's grant, however, went beyond simply acknowledging the castle's current occupant. 130 Within the broader context of the submissions, the grant served to bolster O'Connor Donn's position against his main rival, Turlough O'Connor Ruadh, the main ally of O'Donnell and a supporter of the Avignon papacy in Connacht. Furthermore, when taking the submission of the Donn faction, Richard used clerics loyal to Rome as intermediaries and messengers (such as the bishops of Kilfenora and Kilmacduagh). Further, to prevent these lords' breaking the king's peace, he bound most of them to various sums of money before the representative of the Roman papal camera, Francis de Capanago. 131 The promotion of the Roman Church, in turn, served to limit the influence of Avignon and therefore the Scottish crown in Gaelic Ireland.
Ultimately, it was the fear of a Scottish attack on northern England that convinced Richard to return home, leaving Waterford on 15 May 1395. 132 Traditionally, his expedition of 1394-95 has been regarded as a failure, owing to the necessity of a second expedition in 1399, one that effectively ended his reign. Richard's Irish settlement was nonetheless made unworkable for two main reasons: the territorial ambitions of the earl of March and his ally Ormond, and the activities of O'Donnells. Surviving letters indicate that sometime in late 1394, Niall Óg O'Neill, O'Brien, O'Connor Donn, and Tadhg MacCarthy (d.1428) of Desmond discussed the prospect of submitting. 133 O'Brien and O'Connor Donn were reluctant to submit to Richard and attempted to convince O'Neill of the same. 134 The reasons for their hesitancy are uncertain. It is likely that both lords were anxious at the possibility of a renewed English presence in the west -a region where English influence had been defunct for nearly fifty years. O'Brien and O'Connor Donn also appear to have been faced with significant opposition from their regional allies, the most notable of them being Domhnall O'Connor (d.1395), lord of Sligo-a supporter of O'Connor Donn (see figure 1) . 135 Unlike most other colonial towns lost to the Gaelic Irish, Sligo remained a functioning borough with a lucrative maritime trade. Domhnall may have feared that a renewed English presence in the west would have undermined his control of the port town. 136 By late January 1395, Niall Óg O'Neill was engaged with highly sensitive talks with Richard. Unwilling to tolerate any opposition, Niall Óg threatened to attack Domhnall O'Connor unless he acquiesced and submitted to Richard. 137 While Niall Óg's threat of military intervention in Sligo ultimately secured Domhnall's compliance, the O'Neill aggression demonstrates how lesser families (such as the O'Connors of Sligo) were often expendable in the hands of more powerful lords. figure 1). 159 It was only bickering among Tadhg O'Connor's men and the Clan Alexander over the division of lands, and a surprise counterattack by Murtagh Bacach that saw O'Donnell's forces driven from the region, enabling Murtagh Bacach to regain control of Sligo by early1398. 160 Despite this victory, a considerable amount of damage had been done. Domnall Bog had briefly refused to support Niall Óg against O'Donnell in 1397, effectively giving O'Donnell a free reign in the west. Though Domnall reconciled with Niall Óg in 1398, divisions had been sown between the two dominant O'Neill kindreds in Tyrone. This growing rift would eventually lead to the outbreak of both civil war and a succession crisis in Tyrone during the early fifteenth century (see below).
From the perspective of the crown, the situation in Leinster was little better. Mortimer's attacks on the Gaelic Irish of Ulster and Ormond's activities in Munster made it very difficult for the recently submitted chieftains to remain within the king's peace. Though Dorothy Johnston has argued that Leinster was at peace during 1395-98, evidence contained in the Irish annals suggests a very different state of affairs. 161 Tensions between the Gaelic Irish of Leinster and northeastern Munster increased following a botched attempt at capturing Art MacMurrough-Kavanagh in late 1395. 162 Art's allies, the O'Tooles, are recorded as inflicting a heavy defeat upon English forces in 1396. 163 Though colonial troops, perhaps in retaliation, burned the monastic site of Glendalough in the Wicklow Mountains during the summer of 1398, the O'Connors of Offaly succeeded in capturing Gerald FitzGerald (d.1432), earl of Kildare, the same year. 164 The English position in Leinster was to suffer a further blow later in the year. Despite a brief spell of royal disfavor, owing largely to the activities of his uncle, the Appellant Sir Thomas Mortimer (d.1397), Roger Mortimer was reconciled with Richard and reappointed to his Irish lieutenancy in April 1398-only to perish two months later while campaigning against the O'Byrnes in Carlow. 165 Prior to Mortimer's death Richard had become increasingly concerned about the situation in Ireland and announced his intention to lead a second expedition there in the autumn of 1397. 166 Whether or not the king was genuinely interested in securing a suitable compromise between the crown and the main Irish lords-the O'Neills and Donn faction in particular-remains a matter of debate. 167 Mortimer's death and Kildare's capture in 1398 nonetheless forced Richard's hand regarding Ireland, and the following year, on 1 June 1399, Richard landed at Waterford. 168 Unlike his venture of 1394-95, this expedition proved a military disaster. Richard was soundly beaten by Art MacMurrough-Kavanagh at every turn. The subsequent outbreak of Henry Bolingbroke's rebellion forced Richard to return to England, only to be deposed by the new king in October 1399. 169 The vacuum created by Mortimer's death and Richard's sudden departure allowed Art MacMurrough-Kavanagh to reassert his position in southern Leinster. Mercenaries raised from Munster enabled him to push northwards through Wicklow, while an alliance with Maurice, de facto fifth earl of Desmond, opened a second front against Art's main regional ally, James, earl of Ormond. 170 The situation in Leinster was but one in a series of problems faced by the new Lancastrian administration in Ireland and the wider Irish Sea world. Mortimer's earlier raids on Ulster, followed by the outbreak of civil war in Tyrone, seriously damaged the O'Neills' relationship with the colonial government in Dublin. 
CONCLUSION
Richard II was the last English head of state to lead military operations in Ireland until Oliver Cromwell in 1649. In an age when the "first English Empire" of the thirteenth and earlier fourteenth centuries was entering a period of protracted decline, Richard's Irish expeditions represented a concerted and pragmatic attempt to reverse the "ebb tide" of English power and build stronger links with the more "peripheral" areas of the British Isles. The decline of English power within the wider British Isles during this period, coupled with England's increasing entanglement in France during the Hundred Years' War, has seen an increasing number of scholars gravitate toward the "Plantagenet" model when exploring the development of English royal power in the later Middle Ages. Nonetheless, it is important to locate Richard's Irish ventures within the broader archipelagic context and to utilize a 168 Curtis, "Unpublished Letters," 297-98. regional approach when considering both the English crown's relations with the archipelago's constituent regions and the political development of late medieval Britain and Ireland as whole-the dynamic relationship between elements of Gaelic Ireland and Gaelic Scotland in particular. As a case study, this article has, on one level, offered new insights into Richard's relationship with lords of the wider Gaelic world. On another level, it has demonstrated the necessity of paying closer attention to the Gaelic west as a force within "British" politics. Although the socalled Celtic fringe remains a geographically peripheral region of late medieval Ireland and Britain, developments there could impact and impinge upon the English and Scottish world during both the later Middle Ages and well into early modern periods. The Gaelic world's ability to influence the course of "British" politics and its capacity to destabilize the kingdoms of England and Scotland in these eras however, have yet to be fully appreciated.
